A myriad of access control policy languages have been and continue to be proposed. The design of policy miners for each such language is a challenging task that has required specialized machine learning and combinatorial algorithms. We present an alternative method, universal access control policy mining (Unicorn). We show how this method streamlines the design of policy miners for a wide variety of policy languages including ABAC, RBAC, RBAC with user-attribute constraints, RBAC with spatio-temporal constraints, and an expressive fragment of XACML. For the latter two, there were no known policy miners until now.
INTRODUCTION 1.Motivation and research problem
Numerous access control policy languages have been proposed over the last decades, e.g., RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) [26] , ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control) [37] , XACML (eXtended Access-Control Markup Language) [34] , and new proposals are continually being developed, e.g., [7, 10, 16, 57, 78] . To facilitate the policy specification and maintenance process, policy miners have been proposed, e.g., [12, 18, 31, 33, 43, 52, 56, 77] . These are algorithms that receive an assignment of permissions to users and output a policy that grants permissions to users that match as closely as possible the given assignment.
Designing a policy miner is challenging and requires sophisticated combinatorial or machine-learning techniques. Moreover, policy miners are tailor-made for the specific policy language they were designed for and they are inflexible in that any modification to the miner's requirements necessitates its redesign and reimplementation. For example, miners that mine RBAC policies from access control matrices [31] are substantially different from those that mine RBAC policies from access logs [56] . As evidence for the difficulty of this task, despite extensive work in policy mining, no miner exists for XACML [34] , which is a well-known, standardized language.
Any organization that wishes to benefit from policy mining faces the challenge of designing a policy miner that fits its own policy language and its own requirements. This problem, which we examine in Section 3, is summarized with the following question: is there a more general and more practical method to design policy miners?
Contribution
We propose a radical shift in the way policy miners are built. Rather than designing specialized mining algorithms, one per policy language, we propose Unicorn, a universal method for building policy miners. Using this method, the designers of policy miners no longer must be experts in machine learning or combinatorial optimization to design effective policy miners. Our method gives a step-by-step procedure to build a policy miner from just the policy language and an objective function that measures how well a policy fits an assignment of permissions to users.
Let Γ be a policy language. We sketch below and in Figure 1 the workflow for designing a policy miner for Γ using Unicorn.
Policy language and objective function (Sections 4 and 5). The miner designer specifies a template formula for Γ in a fragment L of first-order logic. Template formulas are explained in Section 4. The designer also specifies an objective function L that measures how well a policy fits a permission assignment.
Probability distribution (Section 5). From φ and L, we define a probability distribution P on policies, conditioned on permission assignments. A permission assignment is a relation between the set of users and the set of permissions. The policy miner is a program that receives as input a permission assignment Auth and aims to compute the most likely policy conditioned on Auth; that is, the policy I that maximizes P (I | Auth).
Approximation (Section 6). Computing max I P (I | Auth) takes time exponential in the size of Auth and I, encoded as strings. Moreover, the function P (I | Auth) has many local maxima. Hence, we use deterministic annealing and mean-field approximation [9, 11, 61, 62] to derive an iterative procedure that computes a distribution q on policies that approximates P (I | Auth). Computing arg max I q (I) takes time polynomial in the size of Auth and I. Implementation (Section 7). The policy miner is a procedure that computes and maximizes q. One need not understand mean-field approximations or deterministic annealing to implement the policy miner. We provide a set of rewriting rules and pseudocode that guide step by step q's computation and maximization (see Algorithm 1 and Lemma 2).
In summary, designing a policy miner for a policy language previously required expertise in machine learning and combinatorial algorithms. Unicorn reduces this to the task of specifying a template formula and implementing q's maximization. We illustrate how specifying template formulas requires only the background in first-order logic provided in this paper and how it amounts to just formalizing the language's semantics in first order logic, a task that is substantially simpler than designing a machine-learning or a combinatorial algorithm.
Applications and evaluation
Using Unicorn, we have built miners for different policy languages like RBAC, ABAC, and RBAC with user attributes. Furthermore, we have built policy miners for RBAC with spatio-temporal constraints and an expressive fragment of XACML, for which no miner existed before. We present them in Sections 8 and 9 and in the appendix.
In Section 10, we conduct an extensive experimental evaluation using datasets from all publicly available real-world case studies on policy mining. We compare the miners we built with state-ofthe-art miners on both real-world and synthetic datasets. The true positive rates of the policies mined by our miners are within 5% of the true positive rates of the policies mined by the state of the art. For policy languages like XACML or RBAC with spatio-temporal constraints, the true positive rates are above 75% in all cases and above 80% in most of them. The false positive rates are always below 5%. For ABAC policies, we mine policies with a substantially lower complexity and higher precision than those mined by the state of the art. This demonstrates that with Unicorn we can build a wide variety of policy miners, including new ones, that are competitive with or even better than the state of the art.
Unicorn's effectiveness follows from the wide applicability of deterministic annealing (DA). This technique has been applied to different optimization problems like the traveling salesman problem [61] , clustering [62] , and image segmentation [36] . DA can also be applied to policy mining. However, in our case, computing the distribution P (I | Auth) required by DA is intractable. Hence, we use mean-field approximation (MFA) to compute a distribution q that approximates P. This distribution q is much easier to compute. Moreover, our approach of DA with MFA turns out to generalize to a wide variety of policy languages.
We examine related work and draw conclusions in Sections 11 and 12. For details on deterministic annealing and mean-field approximation, we refer to the literature [9, 11, 61, 62] .
to users and is formalized in a policy language. The policy is then enforced by mechanisms that intercept each request (a pair consisting of a user and a permission) and check whether it is authorized.
Organizations are highly dynamic. New users come and existing users may go. Moreover, groups of users may be transferred to other organizational units. Such changes induce changes in the access control policy, which are usually manually implemented, giving rise to the following problems. First, the policy may become convoluted and policy administrators no longer have an overview on who is authorized to do what. Second, policy administrators may have granted to users more permissions than needed to do their jobs. This makes the organization vulnerable to abuse by its own users, who may exploit the additional permissions and harm the organization.
To address these problems, numerous policy miners have been proposed [12, 18, 31, 33, 43, 52, 56, 77] . We describe some of them in Section 3.1. Policy miners are algorithms that receive as input the current permission assignment, which is a relation between the set of users and the set of permissions. The permission assignment might be given as an access control matrix or a log of access requests showing the access decisions previously made for each request. It describes the organization's implemented knowledge on which permissions should be assigned to which users. The miner then constructs a policy that is as consistent as possible with the permission assignment and can be expressed using the organization's policy language.
A policy miner aims to solve the two problems mentioned above. First, it can mine succinct policies that grant permissions consistent with the given permission assignment. Second, policy miners can mine policies that assign only those permissions that users necessarily need. An administrator can then compare the mined policy with the currently implemented policy in order to detect permissions that are granted by the current policy, but that are not being exercised by the users. Policy administrators can then inspect those permissions and decide if they are necessary for those users.
The problem of policy mining is defined as follows. Given a permission assignment and an objective function, compute a policy that minimizes the objective function. Usually, objective functions measure how well a policy fits a permission assignment and how complex a policy is. We give examples of objective functions later in Sections 5 and 8.
Quality criteria for policy miners
Policy miners can be regarded as machine-learning algorithms. Therefore, they are evaluated by the quality of the policies they mine, and here two criteria are used:
Generalization [18, 30, 56] . A mined policy should not only authorize requests consistent with the given permission assignment. It must also correctly decide what other permissions should be granted to users who perform similar functions in the organization. This is particularly important when mining from logs. For example, if most of students in a university have requested and been granted access to a computer room, then the mined policy should grant all students access to the computer room rather than just to those who previously requested access to it. For a formal definition of generalization, we refer to previous work and standard references in machine learning [9, 18, 30] . One popular machine-learning method to evaluate generalization is cross-validation [9, 32] .
Complexity [12, 77] . A mined policy should not be unnecessarily complex, as the policies are usually reviewed and audited by humans. This is especially important when mining with the goal of refactoring an existing policy or migrating to a new policy language. However, there is no standard formalization of a policy's complexity, not even for established policy languages like RBAC or ABAC. Each previous work has defined its own metrics to quantify complexity [18, 29, 76, 77] . We discuss some of these metrics in Section 8 and show how Unicorn is able to work with all of them.
THE PROBLEM OF DESIGNING POLICY MINERS 3.1 Status quo: specialized solutions
Numerous policy languages exist for specifying access control policies, which fulfill different organizational requirements. Moreover, new languages are continually being proposed. Some of them formulate new concepts, like extensions of RBAC that can express temporal and spatial constraints [1, 13, 15, 20, 49, 60, 69] . Other languages facilitate policy specification in specialized settings such as distributed systems [34, 70] or social networks [28] .
Motivated by the practical problem of maintaining access control configurations, researchers have proposed policy miners for a variety of policy languages. Moreover, for some policy languages, these miners optimize different objectives. For example, initial RBAC miners mined policies with a minimal number of roles [51, 63, 72, 74, 80] . Subsequent miners mined policies that are as consistent as possible with the user-attribute information [30, 56, 75] .
The development of policy miners is non-trivial and generally requires sophisticated combinatorial and machine-learning algorithms. Recent ABAC miners have used association rule mining [18] and classification trees [14] . The most effective RBAC miners use deterministic annealing [30] and latent Dirichlet allocation [56] .
The proposed miners are so specialized that it is usually unclear how to apply them to other policy languages or even to extensions of the languages for which they were conceived. For example, different extensions of RBAC that support spatio-temporal constraints have been proposed over the last two decades, e.g., [1, 13, 15, 20, 49, 60, 69] . However, not a single miner has been proposed for these extensions. Miners have only recently emerged that mine RBAC policies with constraints, albeit only temporal ones [53, 54, 66] . As a result, if an organization wants to use a specialized policy language, it must invent its own policy miner, which is challenging and time-consuming.
Alternative: A universal method
To facilitate the development of policy miners, we propose a new method, universal access control policy mining (Unicorn). With this method, organizations no longer need to spend substantial effort designing specialized policy miners for their unique and specific policy languages; they only need to perform the following tasks (see also Figure 1 ). First, they specify a template formula φ for the organization's policy language. We explain later in Section 4 what a template formula is. Second, they specify an objective function.
Finally, they implement the miner as indicated by the algorithm template in Section 7. We formalize these tasks in the next sections.
A UNIVERSAL POLICY LANGUAGE
In order to obtain a universal method, we need a framework for specifying policy languages. We choose many-sorted first-order logic [23, 24] , which has been used to model and reason about numerous policy languages, e.g. [3, 19, 40, 71] .
Let Γ be a policy language for which we want to design a policy miner. In this section we explain the first task: the miner designer must specify a template formula φ Γ for Γ. This is a first-order formula that fulfills some conditions that we explain later in Definition 5. We show how Γ can be identified with φ Γ ∈ L and how policies in Γ can be identified with interpretation functions that interpret φ Γ 's symbols. We thereby reduce the problem of designing a policy miner to designing an algorithm that searches for a particular interpretation function.
We start by recalling first-order logic (Section 4.1). Then we provide some intuition on template formulas using RBAC (Section 4.2). Afterwards, we propose a fragment L of first-order logic that is powerful enough to contain template formulas for a variety of policy languages like RBAC, ABAC, and an expressive fragment of XACML (Section 4.3). We then define template formulas (Section 4.4) and give an example of a template formula for RBAC (Section 4.5).
Background in first-order logic
We provide here an overview of basic many-sorted first-order logic and conventions we employ. The reader familiar with logic can read this section lightly. We work only with finite first-order structures. That is, structures whose carrier sets are finite. Later, in our examples, we will see that finite structures are still powerful enough to model practical scenarios, as organizations do not need to handle infinite sets. Even for the case of strings and integers, organizations often only use a finite subset of them.
Definition 1.
A signature is a tuple (S, R, F, V) fulfilling the following, where S is a finite non-empty set of sorts, R is a finite non-empty set of relation symbols, F is a finite non-empty set of function symbols, and V is a countable set of variables.
Each relation and each function symbol has an associated type, which is a sequence of sorts. Furthermore, we assume the existence of two sorts USERS, PERMS ∈ S, denoting the users and the permissions in the organization, respectively. We also assume the existence of the sorts BOOL, INTS, STRS, which represent Boolean values, integers, and strings, respectively. □
We denote sorts with CAPITAL BOLD letters, relation symbols with CAPITAL ITALIC letters, and function symbols and variables with small italic letters. To agree with standard notation, we write a relation symbol's type (S 1 , . . . , S k ) as S 1 ×. . .×S k instead. We write a function's symbol's type (S 1 , . . . , S k ) as S 1 × . . . × S k −1 → S k instead. We allow k = 1 and, in that case, we call function symbols constant symbols. We denote constant symbols with small serif letters.
Definition 2. Let Σ be a signature. We define (first-order) terms as those expressions built from Σ's variables and function symbols in the standard way. We also define (first-order) formulas as those expressions obtained from terms by using relation symbols, terms, and logical operators in the standard way. □ We only allow well-typed terms and formulas and associate to every term a type in the standard way. In addition, we consider only quantifier-free formulas. For a formula φ, if {x 1 , . . . , x n } is the set of all variables occurring in it, then we sometimes write φ (x 1 , . . . , x n ) instead of φ to clarify which variables occur in φ.
Definition 3. Let Σ be a signature. A Σ-structure is a pair K = (S, I). Here, S is a function mapping each sort S in Σ to a finite non-empty set S S , called S's carrier set. S must map BOOL, INTS, and STRS to the sets of Boolean values, a finite set of integers, and a finite set of strings, respectively. I is a function mapping
In particular, a constant symbol of sort S is mapped to an element in S S . For any symbol W in Σ, we call W I , K's interpretation of W . The function I is called an interpretation function.
□ When Σ is irrelevant or clear from the context, we simply say structure instead of Σ-structure. We denote elements of carrier sets with small serif letters like a and b.
Let (S, I). The interpretation function I gives rise in the standard way to a function that maps any formula φ (x 1 , . . . , x n ), with
. . a n ) holds if the formula φ evaluates to true after replacing each x i with a i .
Motivating example
We present an example of a template formula φ RBAC N for the language Γ N of all RBAC policies with at most N roles. We then show that every RBAC policy in Γ can be identified with an interpretation function. With this example, we provide some intuition on an argument we give later in Section 4.4: mining a policy in a policy language Γ is equivalent to searching for an interpretation function that interprets the symbols occurring in a template formula for Γ. Definition 4. An RBAC policy is a tuple π = (U , Ro, P, Ua, Pa). U and P are non-empty sets denoting, respectively, the sets of users and permissions in an organization. Ro is a set denoting the organization's roles. Ua ⊆ U ×Ro and Pa ⊆ Ro×P are binary relations. The policy π assigns a permission p ∈ P to a user u ∈ U if (u, p) ∈ Ua•Pa (i.e., if there is a role r ∈ Ro such that (u, r) ∈ Ua and (r, p) ∈ Pa). □ Consider the language Γ N of RBAC policies with at most N roles. We now present a template formula for Γ N . We only provide some intuition here and give formal justifications in Section 4.5. Let Σ be a signature with two relation symbols UA and PA of types
Here, u and p are variables of sorts USERS and PERMS, respectively, and r i , for i ≤ N , is a constant of sort ROLES. We now make two observations about φ RBAC N (u, p).
Session 1D: Forensics CCS '19, November 11-15, 2019, London, United Kingdom 1) Each RBAC policy in Γ N corresponds to at least one interpretation function. Note that for any Σ-structure K = (S, I) , the tuple
is an RBAC policy. Conversely, one can show that every RBAC policy in Γ N can be associated with a Σ-structure. Observe now that, when an organization wants to mine an RBAC policy, S is already known. Indeed, the organization knows the set of users and permissions. It may not known the set of roles, but it can deduce them from UA I and PA I , once it knows I. Analogously, for all policy languages we studied, we observed that S was always known by the organization. Therefore, we always assume S given and fixed and we conclude that every RBAC policy in Γ N corresponds to at least one interpretation function.
2) The formula φ RBAC N describes Γ N 's semantics. More precisely, if π K has at most N roles, then for any user u in K and any p in K: π K assigns p to u iff φ RBAC N I (u, p). This follows from two arguments. First, by definition, π K assigns p to u if (u, p) ∈ UA I • PA I . Second,
These two observations describe the essence of a template formula. Template formulas define (i) how interpretation functions can represent policies of a policy language and (ii) how a policy (represented by an interpretation function) decides if a permission is assigned to a user.
Language definition
Template formulas are built from the fragment L of quantifier-free first-order formulas.
For any signature, we require the organization to specify, for every relation and function symbol, whether it is rigid or flexible. Rigid symbols are those for which the organization already knows the interpretation function. Flexible symbols are those for which an interpretation function must be found using mining. For example, a function that maps each user to a unique identifier should be modeled with a rigid function symbol, as the organization is not interested in mining new identifiers. In contrast, when mining RBAC policies, one should define a flexible relation symbol to denote the assignment of roles to users, as the organization does not know this assignment and wants to compute it using mining.
Let K = (S, I) be a structure. We can see I as the union of two interpretation functions I r and I f , where I r takes as input rigid symbols and I f takes as input flexible symbols. The goal of policy mining is to search for an interpretation function I f for the flexible symbols that minimizes an objective function. It does not need to search for S as these function defines the carrier sets for sorts like USERS and PERMS, which the organization already knows. It does not need to search for I r either. Hence, we assume that S and I r are fixed and known to the organization. We also let U = USERS S and P = PERMS S . We underline rigid symbols and do not distinguish between W and W I r .
Template formulas
We now formalize template formulas. Let Γ be a policy language and let Pol(Γ) be the set of all policies that can be specified with Γ. Suppose also that the set of access requests is modeled with a set
. . , T ℓ are sorts. For example, for RBAC and many other policy languages that we discuss here, the set of requests is U × P = USERS S × PERMS S .
We assume that the semantics of Γ defines a relation assign Γ ⊆
For example, in RBAC, (π , u, p) ∈ assign RBAC iff π assigns p to u.
Definition 5. Let Γ be a policy language and φ(t 1 , . . . , t ℓ ) be a formula in L, where t 1 , . . . , t ℓ are variables of sorts T 1 , . . . , T ℓ , respectively. The formula φ(t 1 , . . . , t ℓ ) is a template formula for Γ if there is a function M such that (i) M is a surjective function from the set of interpretation functions to Pol (Γ) and (ii) for any interpretation function I and any request (
The mapping M provides a correspondence between interpretations and policies. M guarantees that each policy is represented by at least one interpretation. Therefore, we can search for an interpretation instead of a policy. For this reason, for the rest of the paper, we identify every formula in L with a policy language and also refer to interpretation functions as policies.
Formalizing the example
We now formally define the formula φ RBAC N (u, p) ∈ L, introduced in Section 4.2, and show that it is a template formula for the language Γ N of all RBAC policies with at most N roles. Allowing a maximum number of roles is sufficient as one always can estimate a trivial bound on the maximum number of roles in an organization.
Template formula definition: Consider a signature with a sort ROLES denoting roles and with two (flexible) binary relation symbols UA and PA of types USERS × ROLES and ROLES × PERMS, respectively. Define the formula
Here, r i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is a rigid constant symbol of sort ROLES (recall that we underline rigid symbols and denote constant symbols with serif letters). One could also use flexible constant symbols for roles, but, as we see later, the difficulty of implementing the policy miner increases with the number of flexible symbols.
Correctness proof:
We now define a mapping M that proves that φ RBAC N is a template formula for Γ N . For any interpretation function
It is also easy to prove that M is surjective on the set of all RBAC policies with at most N roles. Hence, we can identify φ RBAC N with the language of all RBAC policies with at most N roles. □ Example 1. To facilitate understanding M, we show an RBAC policy π and an interpretation function I such that M (I) = π . Let N = 2 and assume that U = {Alice, Bob, Charlie} and that P = {c, m, d}. The permissions in P stand for "create", "modify", and Session 1D: Forensics Tables 1 and 2 .
We can define an interpretation function I such that M (I) corresponds to the RBAC policy above. I interprets the relation symbols UA and PA in the formula φ RBAC N (u, p) as follows. For u ∈ U and i ≤ 2, UA I u, r i iff (u, r i ) is marked with an × in Table 1 . Similarly, for p ∈ P and i ≤ 2, Table 2 . □
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
Let φ ∈ L be a policy language. We assume for the rest of the paper that φ has two free variables u and p of sorts USERS and PERMS, respectively. Our presentation extends in a straightforward way to more general cases.
To design a policy miner using Unicorn one must specify an objective function L. This is any function taking two inputs: a per- 
Here, we identify the value 1 with the Boolean value true and the value 0 with the Boolean value false. Observe that L (Auth, I; φ) is the size of the symmetric difference of the relations Auth and φ I . Hence, lower values for L (Auth, I; φ) are better. The policy miners built with Unicorn are probabilistic. They receive as input a permission assignment Auth and compute a probability distribution over the set of all policies in a fixed policy language Γ. We use a Bayesian instead of a frequentist interpretation of probability. The probability of a policy I does not measure how often I is the outcome of an experiment, but rather how strong we believe I to be the policy that decided the requests in Auth.
We now define, given a permission assignment Auth, a probability distribution P (· | Auth) on policies. We first provide some intuition on P (· | Auth)'s definition and afterwards define it. For a permission assignment Auth and a policy I, we can see P (· | Auth) as a quantity telling us how much we believe I to be the organization's policy, given that Auth is the organization's permission assignment.
Policy miners receive as input a permission assignment Auth and then search for a policy I * that maximizes P (· | Auth). Here, P (· | Auth) is defined as the "most general" distribution that fulfills the following requirement: for any policy I, the lower L (Auth, I; φ) is, the more likely I is. Following the principle of maximum entropy [45] , the most general distribution that achieves this is
where I ′ ranges over all policies. Recall that we consider only finite structures. Hence, all our carrier sets are finite, so there are only finitely many policies.
The value β > 0 is a parameter that the policy miner varies during the search for the most likely policy. The search uses deterministic annealing, an optimization procedure inspired by simulated annealing [46, 61, 62] . In our case, it initially sets β to a very low value, so that all policies are almost equally likely. Then it gradually increases β while, at the same time, searching for the most likely policy. As β increases, those policies that minimize L(Auth, · ; φ) become more likely. In this way, deterministic can escape from low-quality local maxima of P (· | Auth). When β → ∞, only those policies that minimize L(Auth, · ; φ) have a positive probability and the search converges to a local maximum of P (· | Auth).
We now define the probability distribution given in Equation 5.
Definition 6. For a formula φ ∈ L, we define the probability space P φ = Ω, 2 Ω , P (· | Auth) as follows.
• Ω is the set of all interpretation functions (i.e., policies). • 2 Ω is the set of all subsets of Ω. Since all carrier sets of all sorts are finite (Definition 3), Ω and 2 Ω are finite.
Finally, for O ∈ 2 Ω , let P (O | Auth) = I∈O P (I | Auth).
□ The following theorem proves that P (· | Auth) is the "most general" distribution that fulfills the requirement mentioned above. More precisely, P (· | Auth) is the maximum-entropy probability distribution where the probability of a policy I increases whenever L(Auth, I; φ) decreases [39, 68] . Theorem 1. P (· | Auth) is the distribution P on policies that maximizes P's entropy and is subject to the following constraints.
• I P (I) L(Auth, I; φ) ≤ ℓ, for some fixed bound ℓ.
• If β > 0, then P (I) > P (I ′ ), for any two policies I and I ′ with L(Auth,
Proof. It suffices to drop the second constraint and use Lagrange multipliers to verify that P (I | Auth) is the optimal distribution. Observe that P (I | Auth) satisfies the second constraint. 
As a result, for any β > 0, we get that P ( Alice × Bob × Charlie × × × Table 7 : 
APPLYING MEAN-FIELD APPROXIMATION
The policy miner that is built with Unicorn is an algorithm that receives as input a permission assignment Auth and computes a policy I that approximately maximizes P (· | Auth), while letting β → ∞. Since computing P (· | Auth) is intractable, we use mean-field approximation [9] , a technique that defines an iterative procedure to approximate P (· | Auth) with a distribution q (·). It turns out that computing and maximizing q(·) is much easier than computing and maximizing P (· | Auth). The policy miner is then an algorithm implementing the computation of q and its maximization. We next introduce some random variables that help to measure the probability that a policy authorizes a particular request (u, p) ∈ U × P (Section 6.1). Afterwards, we present the approximating distribution q (Section 6.2).
Random variables
Recall that the sample space Ω of the distribution P (· | Auth) from Definition 6 is the set of all policies I. Let X be a random variable mapping I ∈ Ω to I. Although X's definition is trivial, it will help us to understand other random variables that we introduce later. We can understand X as an "unknown policy" and, for a policy I, the probability statement P (X = I | Auth) measures how much we believe that X is actually I, given that the organization's permission assignment is Auth. By definition, P (X = I | Auth) = P (I | Auth). 
Recall that S maps sorts to carrier sets. We define the random variable W X (a 1 , . . . , a k ) :
We call these random variables random facts of φ. □ Example 3. Let us examine some random facts of the formula φ RBAC N from Example 2. One such random fact is UA X Alice, r 1 , which can take the values 0 and 1, so UA X Alice, r 1 is a Bernoulli random variable whose probability distribution is defined by
More generally, the set of random facts for φ RBAC
If we set N = 2 and replace each random fact with a Boolean value, as indicated by Tables 4 and 5, then we get an RBAC policy.
Just like a statement of the form P (X = I | Auth) quantifies how much we believe that X = I for a given Auth, a statement of the form P UA X Alice, r 1 = 1 | Auth quantifies how much we believe that role r 1 is assigned to Alice for a given Auth. □ Observation 1. Since we assume carrier sets to be finite, a random fact always has a discrete distribution. In particular, random facts built from flexible relation symbols have Bernoulli distributions as they can only take Boolean values. □ We usually denote random facts with Fraktur letters f, g, . . . For a random fact f of the form W X (a 1 , . . . , a k ), we denote by f I the Boolean value W I (a 1 , . . . , a k ). Similarly, when f is of the form f X (a 1 , . . . , a k ), we denote by f I the value f I (a 1 , . . . , a k ). Finally, we denote f's range with Range (f).
For a policy language φ ∈ L, we denote by F (φ) the set of all random facts of φ. Recall that we assume all our carrier sets to be finite, so F (φ) is finite.
Observe that, for any formula φ ∈ L, replacing each random fact f in F (φ) with a value in Range (f) yields a policy. Hence, a policy miner, instead of searching for a policy I, it just searches for adequate values for all random facts in F (φ). We formalize this in Lemma 1, whose proof is in the full version. Lemma 1. For a policy language φ ∈ L,
We denote by h (·) the function P f X f ∈F(φ ) = · | Auth . To
. We conclude this section by defining some other useful random variables. Recall that X is the random variable that maps I ∈ Ω to I. For φ ∈ L, Auth ⊆ U × P, we define the following random variable:
□
Approximating the distribution
A mean-field approximation of the probability distribution h is a distribution q defined by
where q f : Range (f) → [0, 1] is a probability mass function for f.
Observe that q (I)'s factorization implies that the set of random facts is mutually independent. This is not true in general, as h may not be necessarily factorized like q. This independence assumption is imposed by mean-field theory to facilitate computations. Our experimental results in Section 10 show that, despite this approximation, we still mine high quality policies.
According to mean-field theory, the distributions q f | f ∈ F (φ) that make q best approximate h are given by
where b ∈ Range (f) and E f →b [L (Auth, X; φ)] is the expectation of L (Auth, X; φ) after replacing every occurrence of the random fact f with b [9] . This expectation is computed using the distribution q.
Therefore,
Here, L (Auth, I; φ) {f → b} is obtained from L (Auth, I; φ) by replacing f with b.
Using Lemma 1 and the distribution q, we can approximate arg max I P (I | Auth) by maximizing q.
The desired miner is then an algorithm that computes q, while letting β → ∞, and then computes the policy I * that maximizes q.
BUILDING THE POLICY MINER
To compute q, as given by Equation 11 , the desired policy miner could use Equation 12 to compute q f , for each f ∈ F (φ). Observe, however, that Equation 12 is recursive, since the computation of the expectations on the right hand side requires q f | f ∈ F (φ) , as indicated by Equation 13 . This recursive dependency is handled by iteratively computing, for each f ∈ F (φ), a functionq f that approximates q f [9] . We illustrate this in the step 2a below.
Algorithm 1 gives the pseudocode for computing and maximizing q, which is the essence of the desired policy miner. We give next an overview.
(1) Initialization (lines 2-3)
. Each distributionq f is randomly set to an arbitrary function such that bqf (b) = 1. (2) Update loop (lines [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . We perform a sequence of iterations that update q f | f ∈ F (φ) and β. The number T of iterations is fixed before execution. (a) Parameter update (line 5 -7) . At each iteration, we compute a random ordering RS(F (φ)) of all the random facts.
Then, for each f in that order,q f is updated to the righthand side of Equation 12 (lines 6-7), but instead of using
Hyper-parameter update (line 8). After each iteration, we increase β by a factor of α, defined before execution. This approach, originally defined for deterministic annealing, avoids that the algorithm is trapped in a bad local maximum in the early iterations [61, 62] . (3) Policy computation (line 9). Finally, we compute the policy I * = arg max I q (I). By looking at Equation 11 , we see that to maximize q, it suffices to maximize q f , for every f ∈ F (φ). Hence, we let I * be the policy that satisfies
Algorithm 1: The policy miner.
1 PolicyMiner(L, Auth, φ, α, β,T ):
3 Randomly initializeq f . Observe that the policy miner requires values for the hyperparameters α, β, and T as input. Adequate values can be computed using machine-learning methods like grid search [64] . 
Simplifying the computation of expectations
One need not be knowledgeable about deterministic annealing or mean-field approximations to implement Algorithm 1 in a standard programming language. The only part requiring knowledge in probability theory is the computation of the expectations in line 7. We now define the notion of diverse random variables and show that expectations of some diverse random variables can easily be computed recursively using some basic equalities.
Definition 10. A random variable X is diverse if (i) it can be constructed from constant values and random facts using only arithmetic and Boolean operations and (ii) any random fact is used in the construction at most once. □ 
is not, since each random fact there occurs more than once. □ Corollary 1. Let φ ∈ L and (u, p) ∈ U ×P, then φ X (u, p) is diverse iff every atomic formula that occurs in φ occurs exactly once.
This corollary is a direct consequence of Definition 10. Observe that, for φ ∈ L, one can check in time linear in φ's length that every atomic formula occurring in φ occurs exactly once. Lemma 2. Let f and g be facts, φ be a formula in L, (u, p) ∈ U × P, and {ψ i } i ⊆ L. Assume that φ X (u, p) and ( i ψ i ) X (u, p) are diverse. Then the following equalities hold.
Recall that ∧ and ¬ form a complete set of Boolean operators. So one can also use this lemma to compute expectations of diverse random variables of the form (φ → ψ ) X (u, p) and (φ ∨ ψ ) X (u, p).
RBAC MINING WITH UNICORN
We explain next how to use Unicorn to build an RBAC miner.
RBAC policies
We already explained how the formula φ RBAC N ∈ L is a template formula for the language of all RBAC policies with at most N roles. To implement Algorithm 1, we only need a procedure to compute E f →b L Auth, X; φ RBAC N . Since, as noted in Example 5, φ RBAC N X (u, p) is diverse, we can apply Lemma 2 to show that
where,
is computed analogously. Observe how the computations of expectations is reduced to a simple rewriting procedure by applying Lemma 2. We can now implement an RBAC miner by implementing Algorithm 1 in a standard programming language and using the results above to compute the needed expectations.
Simple RBAC policies
The objective function used above has a limitation. When the number of role constants N used by φ RBAC N (u, p) is very large, we might obtain a policyĨ that assigns each role to exactly one user. The role assigned to a user would be assigned all permissions that the user needs. As a result, L(Auth,Ĩ; φ RBAC N ) = 0, butĨ is not a desirable policy. We can avoid mining such policies by introducing in the objective function a regularization term that measures the complexity of the mined policy I. A candidate regularization term is:
Observe that ∥I∥ measures the sizes of the relations UA I and PA I , for i ≤ N , thereby providing a measure of I's complexity. We now define the following loss function: L r RBAC (Auth, I) = λ ∥I∥ + L(Auth, I; φ). Here λ > 0 is a trade-off hyper-parameter, which again must be fixed before executing the policy miner and can be estimated using grid search. Note that L r RBAC penalizes not only policies that substantially disagree with Auth, but also policies that are too complex.
The computation of E f →b L r RBAC (Auth, X) now also requires computing E f →b [∥X∥], where ∥X∥ is the random variable obtained by replacing each occurrence of I in ∥I∥ with X. Fortunately, one can see that ∥X∥ is diverse. Hence, we can use the linearity of expectation and Lemma 2 to compute all needed expectations.
MINING SPATIO-TEMPORAL RBAC POLICIES
We now use Unicorn to build the first policy miner for RBAC extensions with spatio-temporal constraints [1, 4, 5, 8, 19, 41] . In policies in these extensions, users are assigned permissions not only Session 1D: Forensics CCS '19, November 11-15, 2019, London, United Kingdom according to their roles, but also based on constraints depending on the current time and the user's and the permission's locations. The syntax for specifying these constraints allows for policies like "a user is assigned the role Engineer from Monday through Friday and from 8:00 AM until 5:00 PM" or "the role Engineer is granted permission to access any object within a radius of three miles from the main building. "
We present a template formula φ st (t, u, p) ∈ L for a policy language that we call spatio-temporal RBAC. This is an extension of RBAC with a syntax for spatial constraints based on [4, 5] and a syntax for temporal constraints based on temporal RBAC [6] .
Here, we assume the existence of a sort TIME and that t is a variable of this sort representing the time when u exercises p. We also assume the existence of a sort SPACE that we use to specify spatial constraints. The formulas ψ UA (t, u, r i ) and ψ PA (t, r i , p) describe when a user is assigned the role r i and when a permission is assigned to the role r i , respectively. We use the rigid constants r 1 , . . . , r N to denote roles.
The grammar Γ st below defines the syntax of ψ UA and ψ PA . An expression in this grammar is a conjunction of constraints, each of which is either a disjunction of temporal constraints or a disjunction of spatial constraints. Observe that a policy miner does not need to compute interpretations for rigid function symbols like Loc or rigid relation symbols like isWithin, since they already have a fixed interpretation.
Modeling spatial constraints

Modeling temporal constraints
A temporal constraint is a formula ψ cal (t) that represents a periodic expression [6] , which describes a set of time intervals. We give here a simplified overview and refer to the literature for details [6] . 
□ Previous works on analyzing temporal RBAC with SMT solvers [40] show that temporal constraints can be expressed as formulas in L. Furthermore, one can verify that any expression in Γ st and, therefore, φ st is in L.
As an objective function, we use λ ∥I∥ + L Auth, I; φ st . Here, ∥I∥ counts the number of spatial constraints plus the sum of the weighted structural complexities of all temporal constraints [66] . For computing expectations, one can show that ∥X∥ is diverse and that every atomic formula in φ st occurs exactly once. Hence, one can compute all necessary expectations using the linearity of expectation and Lemma 2.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we experimentally validate two hypotheses. First, using Unicorn, we can build policy miners for a wide variety of policy languages. Second, the policies mined by these miners have as low complexity and high generalization ability as those mined by the state of the art.
Datasets
Our experiments are divided into the following categories.
Mine RBAC policies from access control matrices. We use three access control matrices from three real organizations, named "healthcare", "firewall", and "americas" [25] . For healthcare, there are 46 users and 46 permissions, for firewall, there are 720 users and 587 permissions, and for americas, there are more than 10,000 users and around 3,500 permissions. We refer to these access control matrices as RBAC1, RBAC2, and RBAC3.
Mine ABAC policies from logs. We use four logs of access requests provided by Amazon for a Kaggle competition in 2013 [43] , where participants had to develop mining algorithms that predicted from the logs which permissions must be assigned to which users. We refer to these logs as ABAC1, ABAC2, ABAC3, and ABAC4.
Mine business-meaningful RBAC policies from access control matrices. We use the access control matrix provided by Amazon for the IEEE MLSP 2012 competition [38] , available at the UCI machine learning repository [50] . It assigns three types of permissions, named "HOST", "PERM_GROUP", and "SYSTEM_GROUP" to 30,000 users. The number of permissions for each type are approximately 1,700, 6,000, and 20,000, respectively. For each type of permission, we sampled 5,000 users from all 30,000 users and used all permissions of that type to build an access control matrix. We explain in detail how we create these matrices in Appendix D.1. We refer to these matrices as BM-RBAC1, BM-RBAC2, and BM-RBAC3.
Mine XACML policies from access control matrices. We use Continue [27, 47] , the most complex set of XACML policies in the literature. We use seven of the largest policies in the set. For each of them, we compute the set of all possible requests and decide which of them are authorized by the policy. We then mine a policy from this set of decided requests. For the simplest policy, there are around 60 requests and for the most complex policy, there are more than 30,000 requests. We call these seven sets of requests XACML1, XACML2, ..., XACML7.
Mine spatio-temporal RBAC policies from logs. There are no publicly available datasets for mining spatio-temporal RBAC policies. Based on policies provided as examples in recent works [4, 5] , we created a synthetic policy and a synthetic log by creating 1,000 access requests uniformly at random and evaluating them against the policy. We refer to this log as STARBAC. The synthetic policy is described in Appendix D.2.
Methodology
For RBAC and ABAC, we mine two policies in the corresponding policy language's syntax. The first one using a miner built using Unicorn and the second one using a state-of-the-art miner. Details on the miners built using Unicorn are given in Sections 8 and 9, and Appendices B and C. For RBAC, we use for comparison the miner presented in [30] and, for ABAC, we use for comparison the miner from [18] . For XACML and spatio-temporal RBAC, there are no other known miners. For business meaningful RBAC, we contacted the authors of miners for this RBAC extension [30, 56] , but implementations of their algorithms were not available.
As an objective function we use λ ∥I∥ + L (Auth, I; φ), where λ is a trade-off hyper-parameter, ∥I∥ is the complexity measure defined for I in the policy language, and φ is the template formula for the corresponding policy language. The values for the hyperparameters were computed using grid search. To evaluate miners for RBAC, BM-RBAC, and XACML, we use 5-fold cross-validation [21, 22, 79] . To measure the mined policy's generalizability, we measure its true positive rate (TPR) and its false positive rate (FPR) [59] . To measure a mined policy's complexity, we use ∥I∥. To evaluate miners for ABAC and STARBAC, which receive a log instead of an access control matrix as input, we use universal cross-validation [18] . We measure the mined policy's TPR, FPR, precision, and complexity. We considered only those mined policies whose FPR was below 5%.
All policy miners, except the one for BM-RBAC, were developed in Python 3.6 and were executed on machines with 2,8 GHz 8-core CPUs and 32 GB of RAM. The miner for BM-RBAC was developed in Pytorch version 0.4 [58] and executed on an NVIDIA GTX Titan X GPU with 12 GB of RAM. For all policy languages except STARBAC, our experiments finished within 4 hours. For STARBAC, they took 7 hours. We remark that organizations do not need to mine policies on a regular basis, so policies need not be mined in real time [18] .
Results
Figures 2-4 compare, respectively, the TPRs, complexities, and precisions of the policies we mined with those mined by the state of the art across the different datasets with respect to the different policy languages. We make the following observations.
• We mine policies whose TPR is within 5% of the state-of-theart policies' TPR. For the XACML and STARBAC scenarios, where no other miners exist, we mine policies with a TPR above 75% in all cases. • In most cases, we mine policies with a complexity lower than the complexity of policies mined by the state of the art. Figure 3 : Comparison of the complexities between policies mined using Unicorn and policies mined using the state of the art across different policy languages. Policies with lower complexities are better as they are easier to interpret by humans. For XACML and STARBAC, there is no known miner, but we compared the mined policy's complexity with that of the original policy.
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Unicorn State of the art Figure 4 : Comparison of the precision between policies mined using Unicorn and policies mined by a state of the art policy miner across different policy languages. Policies with higher precision are better as they avoid incorrect authorizations. We only compare the precision of mined policies when mining from logs, as discussed in [18] .
• When mining from logs, we mine policies that have a similar or greater precision than those mined by the state of the art, sometimes substantially greater. • In all cases, we mine policies with an FPR ≤ 5% (not shown in the figures).
Discussion
Our experimental results show that, with the exception of ABAC, all policies we mined attain a TPR of at least 80% in most of the cases. The low TPR in ABAC is due to the fact that the logs contain only 7% of all possible requests [18] . But even in that case, the ABAC miner we built attains a TPR that is within 5% of the TPR attained by the state of the art [18] . Moreover, our ABAC miner mines policies with substantially lower complexity and higher precision. These results support our hypothesis that by using Unicorn we can build competitive policy miners for a wide variety of policy languages. These results also suggest that the miners built are well-suited for practical use. In this regard, note that policy miners are tools that facilitate the specification and maintenance of policies. They are not intended to replace human policy administrators, especially when the miners work on logs. This is because logs contain just an incomplete view of how permissions should be assigned to users. Very sparse logs, like those used for the experiments on ABAC, contain barely 7% of all possible authorization requests. Hence, we cannot expect policy miners to deduce how all permissions should be assigned from such logs. The policy administrator must review the mined policy and specify how it should decide groups of requests that are not well represented in the log. For this reason, mined policies must also be simple. The main application of policy miners is to reduce the cumbersome effort of manually analyzing logs (or, more generally, permission assignments) and mine policies that generalize well (see Section 2.2).
Observe that the mined policies correctly authorize at least 40% of future requests in all cases for ABAC and that in some cases they correctly authorize 80% of all requests. All this with a false positive rate below 5%. This means that the mined policy has already reduced the policy administrator's work by at least 40% and in most of the cases by at least 80%. The administrator now only needs to decide how the policy should decide groups of requests that are not represented in the log. 11 RELATED WORK 11.1 Policy mining 11.1.1 RBAC mining. Early research on policy mining focused on RBAC [25, 48, 73] . The approaches developed used combinatorial algorithms to find, for an assignment of permissions to users, an approximately minimal set of role assignments, e.g., [51, 63, 72, 74, 80] . A major step forward was the use of machine-learning techniques like latent Dirichlet allocation [56] and deterministic annealing [30, 67] to compute models that maximize the likelihood of the given assignment of permission to users. More recent works mine RBAC policies with time constraints [53, 54] and role hierarchies [35, 66] , using combinatorial techniques that are specific to the RBAC extension.
Despite the plethora of RBAC miners, there are still many RBAC extensions for which no miner has been developed. A recent survey in role mining [55] , covering over a dozen RBAC miners, reports not a single RBAC miner that can mine spatio-temporal constraints, even though there have been several spatio-temporal extensions of RBAC since 2000, e.g., [1, 13, 15, 20, 49, 60, 69] , and additional extensions are under way [4, 5] . Unicorn offers a practical solution to mining RBAC policies for these extensions. As illustrated in Section 9, we can now mine spatio-temporal RBAC policies.
Other miners.
Miners have recently been proposed for other policy languages like ABAC [18, 76] and ReBAC (Relationship-Based Access Control) [12] . These algorithms use dedicated combinatorial and machine-learning methods to mine policies tailored to the given policy language. Unicorn has the advantage of being applicable to a much broader class of policy languages.
Interpretable machine learning
Machine-learning algorithms have been proposed that train an interpretable model [2, 17, 42, 44, 65] consisting of a set of humanreadable rules that describe how an instance is classified. Such algorithms are attractive for policy mining, as policies must not only correctly grant and deny access, they should also be easy to understand.
The main limitation of the rules mined by these models is that they often do not comply with the underlying policy language's syntax. State-of-the-art algorithms in this field [2, 17, 65] produce rules that are simply conjunctions of constraints on the instances' features. This is insufficient for many policy languages, like XACML, where policies can consist of nested subpolicies that are composed with XACML's policy combination algorithms [34] .
The main advantage of Unicorn is that it can mine policies that not only correctly grant and deny access in most cases, but are also compliant with a given policy language's syntax, like XACML. Moreover, as illustrated in Section 8.2, one can tailor the objective function so that the policy miner searches for a simple policy.
CONCLUSION
The difficulty of specifying and maintaining access control policies has spawned a large and growing number of policy languages with associated policy miners. However, developing such miners is challenging and substantially more difficult than creating a new policy language. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that existing mining algorithms are inflexible in that they cannot be easily modified to mine policies for other policy languages with different features. In this paper, we demonstrated that it is in fact possible to create a universal method for building policy miners that works very well for a wide variety of policy languages.
We validated Unicorn's effectiveness experimentally, including a comparison against state-of-the-art policy miners for different policy languages. In all cases, the miners built using Unicorn are competitive with the state of the art.
As future work, we plan to automate completely the workflow in Figure 1 . We envision a universal policy mining algorithm based on Algorithm 1 that, given as input the policy language, the permission assignment, and the objective function, automatically computes the probabilistic model and the most likely policy constrained by the given permission assignment.
When mining ABAC policies, we are not only given a permission assignment Auth ⊆ U × P, but also attribute assignment relations UAtt ⊆ U × AttVals and PAtt ⊆ P × AttVals that describe what attribute values each user and each permission has. Here, AttVals denotes the set of possible attribute values. We refer to previous work for a discussion on how to obtain these attribute assignment relations [18, 77] .
The objective in mining ABAC policies is to find a set of rules that assigns permissions to users based on the users' and the permissions' attribute values. We explain next how to build a policy miner for ABAC using Unicorn. Let Rules and AttVals be sorts for rules and attribute values, respectively. Let RUA and RPA be flexible binary relation symbols of type Rules × AttVals. For M, N ∈ N, the formula φ ABAC M, N (u, p) below is a template formula for ABAC:
.
In this formula, s i , for i ≤ N , is a rigid constant symbol of sort
Rules denoting a rule. The symbol a j , for j ≤ M, is a rigid constant denoting an attribute value. The formula RUA s i , a j describes whether rule s i requires the user to have the attribute value a j . The formula RPA s i , a j describes an analogous requirement. We use two rigid relation symbols UAtt and PAtt to represent the attribute assignment relations. The formulas UAtt u, a j and PAtt p, a j describe whether u and p, respectively, are assigned the attribute value Observe that a policy miner does not need to find an interpretation for the symbols UAtt and PAtt because the organization already has interpretations for those symbols. When mining ABAC policies, the organization already knows what attribute values each user and each permission has and wants to mine from them an ABAC policy. The miner only needs to specify which attribute values must be required by each rule. This is why we specify the attribute assignment relations with rigid symbols.
We use L(Auth, I; φ ABAC M, N ) as the objective function. Observe that every atomic formula occurs at most once in φ ABAC M, N , so, by Corollary 1, we can use Lemma 2 to compute all relevant expectations.
Finally, we can also add a regularization term to L(Auth, I; φ ABAC M, N ) to avoid mining policies with too many rules or unnecessarily large rules. One such regularization term is
The expression ∥I∥ counts the number of attribute values required by each rule, which is a common way to measure an ABAC policy's complexity [18, 77] . If we instead use the objective function λ ∥I∥ + L(Auth, I; φ ABAC M, N ), then the objective function penalizes not only policies that differ substantially from Auth, but also policies that are too complex. Observe that ∥X∥ is diverse. Hence, we can use the linearity of expectation and Lemma 2 to compute all expectations needed to implement Algorithm 1.
B.2 ABAC policies from logs
Some miners are geared towards mining policies from logs of access requests [18, 56, 76] . We now present an objective function that can be used to mine ABAC policies from access logs, instead of permission assignments. We let φ := φ ABAC M, N for the rest of this subsection. A log G is a disjoint union of two subsets A and D of U ×P, denoting the requests that have been authorized and denied, respectively.
In the case of ABAC, a policy mined from a log should aim to fulfill three requirements. The policy should be succinct, generalize well, and be precise [18] . Therefore, we define an objective function L ′ ABAC (G, I) as the sum
The term ∥I∥ is as defined in Section B.1 and aims to make the policy succinct by penalizing complex policies. The term L 1 (G, I) aims to make the mined policy generalize well and is defined as
Finally, the function L 2 (G, I) aims to make the mined policy precise by penalizing policies that authorize too many requests that are not in the log.
One can show that φ X (u, p) is diverse, for any (u, p) ∈ U × P. Therefore, we can compute E f →b L ′ ABAC (G, X) using only the linearity of expectation and Lemma 2.
B.3 Business-meaningful RBAC policies
Frank et. al. [30] developed a probabilistic policy miner for RBAC policies that incorporated business information. Aside from a permission assignment, the miner takes as input an attribute-assignment relation AA ⊆ U × AVal, where AVal denotes all possible combination of attribute values. It is assumed that each user is assigned exactly one combination of attribute values.
This miner grants similar sets of roles to users that have similar attribute values. For this, it uses the following formula ∆(u, u ′ , I) that measures the disagreement between the roles that a policy I assigns to two users u and u ′ : Here, N denotes the total of users. Note that AA is a rigid relation symbol representing AA. Its interpretation is therefore fixed and not computed by the policy miner.
To mine business-meaningful RBAC policies, we use the objective function λ ∥I∥ + L Auth, I; φ RBAC N , where λ > 0 is a trade-off hyper-parameter. Observe that this objective function penalizes the following types of policies.
• Policies that assign significantly different sets of roles to users with the same attribute values. • Policies whose assignment of permissions to users substantially differs from the assignment given by Auth.
The random variable ∥X∥ is, however, not diverse. This is because, for i ≤ N , the random fact UA X (u, r i ) occurs more than once in ∆(u, u ′ , X). Nonetheless, observe that
One can then compute E f→b [∆(u, u ′ , X)] by using the linearity of expectation and the fact that E [X n ] = (E [X ]) n , for n ∈ N and X a Bernoulli random variable. Hence,
One can check that this observation and Lemma 2 suffice to compute the expectations necessary for Algorithm 1.
C MINING XACML POLICIES
Although XACML is the de facto standard for access control specification, no algorithm has previously been proposed for mining XACML policies. We now illustrate how, using Unicorn, we have built the first XACML policy miner.
C.1 Background
XACML syntax. To simplify the presentation, we use a reduced version of XACML, given as a BNF grammar below. However, our approach extends to the core XACML. Moreover, our reduced XACML is still powerful enough to express Continue [27, 47] , a benchmark XACML policy used for policy analysis. DenyOv denote XACML's standard policy combination algorithms. We explain later how they work. For a policy π , we denote its combination algorithm by Comb (π ) and, for a rule r , we denote its decision by Dec(r ).
XACML semantics. We now recall XACML's semantics. A request is a subset of AVals denoting the attribute values that a subject s, an action a, and an object o satisfy when s attempts to execute a on o. We denote by 2 AVals the set of requests. A request satisfies a rule (δ, α ) if the request contains all attributes in α. In this case, if δ = allow, then we say that the rule authorizes the request; otherwise, we say that the rule denies the request.
A policy π of the form (AllowOv, π ′ 1 , . . . , π ′ ℓ ) authorizes a request z if there is an i ≤ ℓ such that π ′ i authorizes z. The policy π denies z if no π ′ i , for i ≤ ℓ, authorizes z, but some π ′ j , for j ≤ ℓ, denies it.
A policy π of the form (DenyOv, π ′ 1 , . . . , π ′ ℓ ) denies a request if some π ′ i denies it. The policy authorizes the request if no π ′ i denies it, but some π ′ i authorizes it. A policy π of the form (FirstApp, π ′ 1 , . . . , π ′ ℓ ) authorizes a request if there is an i ≤ ℓ such that π ′ i authorizes it and π ′ j , for j < i, neither authorizes it nor denies it. The policy denies a request if there is i ≤ ℓ such that π ′ i denies it and π ′ j , for j < i, neither authorizes it nor denies it.
C.2 Auxiliary definitions
For a policy π = κ, π ′ 1 , . . . , π ′ ℓ , we call π ′ i a child of π . A policy is a descendant of π if it is a child of π or is a descendant of a child of π .
A policy π has breadth N ∈ N if ℓ ≤ N and each of π 's children is either a rule or has breadth N . A policy π has depth is M ∈ N (i) if M = 1 and each of its children is a rule, or (ii) if M > 1 and some child of π has depth M − 1 and the rest have depth at most M − 1.
Two formulas ψ 1 ,ψ 2 ∈ L are mutually exclusive if there is no I and no z ∈ 2 AVals such that both ψ I 1 (z) and ψ I 2 (z) hold. When ψ 1 and ψ 2 are mutually exclusive, we write ψ 1 ⊕ ψ 2 instead of ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 .
C.3 A template formula for XACML
For M, N ∈ N, we present a template formula for the language of all XACML policies of depth and breadth at most M and N , respectively.
Let S be the set of all N -ary sequences of length at most M and let ϵ ∈ S be the empty sequence. For j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, we denote by σ ▷ j the result of appending j to σ and by j ◁ σ the result of prepending j to σ .
Let REQS be a sort representing all requests, AVALS be a sort representing all attribute values, and POLS a sort representing policies and rules. For each σ ∈ S, define a rigid constant y σ symbol of sort POLS such that y σ y σ ′ , whenever σ σ ′ . The set of rigid constants {y σ | σ ∈ S} are intended to represent a tree of XACML policies and rules. The constant y ϵ is the root policy. For σ ∈ S with length less than M and j ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}, the constant y σ ▷j represents one of y σ 's children.
Let z be a variable of sort REQS. Formula C.1 presents a template formula for the XACML fragment introduced above. We explain its main parts.
We define signature symbols that represent all terminal symbols in the BNF grammar above. For example, we define two rigid constant symbols XAllows and XDenies that represent the decisions allow and deny. We define two flexible function symbols XDec and where XRequiresAVal is a flexible relation symbol and hasAttVal and a, for a ∈ AVals, are rigid symbols. For a policy I, XRequiresAVal I y σ , a holds if y σ is a rule and requires attribute a to be satisfied. The formula hasAttVal z, a checks if the request contains attribute a.
In the full version, we show that the formula φ XACML M, N is a template formula for the language of all XACML policies of depth and breadth at most M and N , respectively.
Having a template formula for this XACML fragment, we now define an objective function. An example of an objective function is λ ∥I∥ +L Auth, I; φ XACML M, N , where λ > 0 is a hyper-parameter and ∥I∥ defines I's complexity. We inductively define the complexity compl (π ) of a XACML policy π as follows.
• If π = (δ, α ), then compl (π ) = |α |.
• If π = (κ, (π 1 , . . . , π k )), then compl (π ) = |α |.
Finally, we define ∥I∥ as compl (M (I)).
C.4 Computing expectations
For a formula φ ∈ L and a request z ∈ 2 AVals , we define the random variable φ X (z) in a way similar to the one given in Section 6.1. We now give some auxiliary definitions and lemmas that help to compute E f→b φ XACML M, N X (z) . Proofs are in the full version.
Lemma 5. Let z ∈ 2 AVals andψ 1 ,ψ 2 be mutually exclusive formulas, then
Definition 12. A set Φ ⊆ L of formulas is unrelated if for every φ ∈ Φ and every atomic formula α occurring in φ, there is no ψ ∈ Φ \ φ such that α occurs in φ. □ Lemma 6. If z ∈ 2 AVals and Φ is a set of unrelated formulas, then φ X (z) | φ ∈ Φ , under the distribution q, is mutually independent.
Lemma 7. We can compute E f→b φ XACML M, N X (z) using only the equations given in Lemmas 3 and 5.
Proof. Observe that every atomic formula in allowsRule y σ , z
Using Lemmas 5 and 3, we can show that
Therefore, E f→b allowsPol X y σ , z can be computed using only Lemmas 5 and 3.
Finally, recall that φ XACML By Lemma 6, the corresponding set of random variables is independent. Hence, we can use Lemma 3 to reduce the computation of E f→b φ XACML M, N X (z) to the computation of E f→b XIsRule X y σ , E f→b allowsRule X y σ , z , and E f→b allowsPol X y σ , z . However, as observed above, all these expectations can be computed using Lemmas 3 and 5. Hence, we can compute E f→b φ XACML M, N X (z) using only those two lemmas.
□ Having proven the previous lemmas, we can now implement Algorithm 1 to produce a policy miner for XACML policies.
D DATASETS AND SYNTHETIC POLICIES USED FOR EXPERIMENTS D.1 Datasets for BM-RBAC
We use the access control matrix provided by Amazon for the IEEE MLSP 2012 competition [38] . They assign three types of permissions, named "HOST", "PERM_GROUP", and "SYSTEM_GROUP". For each type of permission, we created an access control matrix by collecting all users and all permissions belonging to that type. There are approximately 30,000 users, 1,700 permissions of type "HOST", 6,000 of type "PERM_GROUP", and 20,000 of type "SYS-TEM_GROUP".
The resulting access control matrices are far too large to be handled efficiently by the policy miner we developed. To address this, during 5-fold cross-validation, we worked instead with an access control submatrix induced by a sample of 30% of all users. Each fold used a different sample of users. To see why this is enough, we remark that, in RBAC policies, the number R of roles is usually much smaller than the number N of users. Moreover, the number K of possible subsets of permissions that users are assigned by RBAC policies is small in comparison to the whole set of possible subsets of permissions. If N is much larger than K, then, by the pidgeonhole principle, many users have the same subset of permissions. Therefore, it is not necessary to use all N users to mine an adequate RBAC policy, as only a fraction of them has all the necessary information. The high TPR (above 80%) of the policy that we mined supports the fact that using a submatrix is still enough to mine policies that generalize well.
D.2 Synthetic policy for spatio-temporal RBAC
We present here the synthetic spatio-temporal RBAC policy that we used for our experiments. We assume the existence of five rectangular buildings, described in Table 10 . The left column indicates the building's name and the right column describes the two-dimensional coordinates of the building's corners. There are five roles, which we describe next. We regard a permission as an action executed on an object.
Name
Corners Main building (1, 3) , (1, 4) , (4, 4), (4, 3) Library
(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 1) Station (8, 1), (8, 9) , (9, 9) , (9, 1) Laboratory (2, 6), (2, 8) , (4, 8) , (4, 6) Computer room (6, 6), (6, 7), (7, 7), (7, 6) Table 10 The first role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• The user is at most 1 meter away from the computer room.
• The object is in the computer room or in the laboratory.
• The current day is an odd day of the month.
• The current time is between 8AM and 5PM. The second role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• The user is outside the library.
• The object is at most 1 meter away from the library.
• Either the current day is before the 10th day of the month and the current time is between 2PM and 8PM or the current day is after the 15th day of the month and the current time is between 8AM and 12PM. The third role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• The user is at most 3 meters away from the main building.
• The object is at most 3 meters away from the main building. The fourth role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• The user is inside the library.
• The object is outside the library.
• The current day is before the 15th day of the month. • The current time is between 12AM and 12PM. The fifth role assigns a permission to a user if all of the following hold:
• The user is inside the main building, at most 1 meter away from the library, inside the laboratory, at most 2 meters away from the computer room, or inside the station. • The object satisfies the same spatial constraint.
• The current day is before the 15th day of the month.
• The current time is between 12AM and 12PM.
